INTRODUCTION
India is finding itself in a very tight spot. The decision of 5th August 2019 is taking its toll. The removal of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and its bifurcation has provoked Pakistan and the great dragon in the North.
Looking back at Chinese policy we have seen that China has always been kind to India. It encouraged trade and allowed India to fill the huge gap of its trade deficit with India. New Delhi’s trade deficit with China fell to $48.66 billion in 2019-20 due to a decline in exports. Indian Exports to China in the 2019-20 financial year stood at $16.6 billion, while imports increased to $65.26 billion.
Sikkim is claimed by PRC as historically Chinese territory but China allowed India to make a trading post there to encourage peace and trade . Similarly, Beijing encouraged dialogue to resolve border issues with India. China even tried India to join its BRI project which India declined, forcing China to abandon this idea.
Indian decision of August 5 2019 changed Chinese policy. Indian home minister Amit shah in Indian parliament claimed that Indian Kashmir Includes Aksai Chin and India will reclaim its territory and bring it back to Union. This statement offended Chinese and relations started to deteriorate.
The majority of the Ladakh area was historically considered Part of Tibet. Clashes started between India and China in April / May 2020. Both sides used Sticks and non-lethal weapons to push each other. According to Indians, PLA occupied Indian Territory in 7 sectors in Ladakh including Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, Pangong Lake and Naku La, Depsang Plains in the sub-sector north and Demchok in the south.
China claimed that boundary is not demarcated. Change of status in Kashmir has made all understandings Null and void. China is claiming that Line of Actual Control (LAC) is a loose demarcation line that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory . China claims that the territory which was mentioned by Zhou Enlai in a 1959 in his letter to Jawaharlal Nehru belongs to PRC.
Recent border row started when Indian Army discovered Chinese advances in April 2020. Both sides tried to resolve the dispute at diplomatic as well as military commander’s level. On Night between 15/16 an Indian patrol headed by CO 16 Bihar regiment approached Chinese position. CO was accompanied by a Lt Colonel and few majors along with dozens of Jco’s and OR’s to check weather PLA has vacated its position or not. Argument between PLA troops and Indians started, resulting in clash in which more than 20 Indian soldiers are killed along with their Commanding officer. PLA also captured dozens of Indian officers and OR’s.
Soon Indian media reported the clash and the Indian army twice changed its statement about the incident. Opposition parties called for all party conference in which PM Modi denied any incursion by PLA.
At the end of 2022 another significant clash occurred on 9 December 2022, Indian Army and PLA troops clashed in the Yangtse area of Tawang, along Line or actual control at eastern sector. The clash in the Tawang region was the most serious scuffle between the two sides since their deadly clash in the Galwan Valley in 2020.
The violent clash in the Galwan valley in eastern Ladakh in 2020 fundamentally altered the dynamics of the India-China relationship. China’s increasing frustration with Indian political elite’s policy of hostility with China and becoming pivot in U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy along with unilateral action of August 5 2019 forced PRC to adopt tough policy against India and has also made boundary question to the center of the India-China relationship
India China relation dates back to ancient times. The Silk Road not only served as a major trade route connecting India and China, but is also attributed for helping the spread of Buddhism from India to China and East Asia .
Sino India modern day relations were established in 1950. India was first noncommunist state which established former relations with People Republic of China and ended its recognition of Republic of China (modern day Taiwan).
SINO INDIA BORDER DISPUTE
Sino-Indian Border disagreement is result of colonial legacy. British India had its own version of Sino India border and through coercion it occupied land belonging to what now constitute People Republic of China, for example, Tawang was historically part of Tibet but in 1914 through Simla Conference, Tibet and British India signed a treaty outlining their common boundary in the Assam Himalaya region, which became the McMahon Line. By this treaty, Tibet abandoned several hundred square miles of its territory, including Tawang, to the British but after Chinese revolution in 1949, China refused to recognize this treaty .
The LAC is different from the borders claimed by each country in the Sino-Indian border dispute. The Indian claims include the entire Aksai Chin and the Chinese claims include Arunachal Pradesh.
The LAC is generally divided into three sectors :
1. Western sector flanked by Ladakh on the Indian side and the Tibet and Xinjiang autonomous regions on the Chinese side. This sector was the location of the 2020 China–India clashes.
2. Middle sector between Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh on the Indian side and the Tibet autonomous region on the Chinese side.
3. Eastern sector between Arunachal Pradesh on the Indian side and the Tibet autonomous region on the Chinese side. This sector generally follows the McMahon Line.
The term "line of actual control" or LAC initially denoted only to the boundary in the western sector after the 1962 Sino-Indian War, but during the 1990s came to refer to the entire de facto border.
Vagueness about the Indian border with China is the main reason of border dispute between two powers. The British initiatives to establish the Himalayan boundaries were guided mainly by its strategic rivalry with Russia. Accordingly, the firmness to define the borders of the British Empire rose only when the Great Game exaggerated between the two superpowers. The British government in India up until then held no clear understanding of India’s land limits along the enormous Indo-Tibetan border. In the western sector, the first attempt to clarify the boundary line was taken in 1865. Then-Surveyor General of India Sir W. H. Johnson, in a bid to affect the Dogra ruler, formed wide-ranging border claim extending the Dogra state border to the Kunlun Mountains and including all of Aksai Chin . Since other British officials were skeptical about Johnson’s claims, the boundary proposition died a natural death, until it was revived in 1897 by the head of the British military intelligence Sir John Ardagh, who believed that implementation of the forward positions in Johnson’s line would secure strategic leverage against Russia in the event of an British-Russian confrontation. This boundary came to be known as the Ardagh-Johnson line, and later formed the basis of India’s claims to Aksai Chin.
From 1865 and 1897, British colonial administrators portrayed different versions of the northern and north-eastern frontier of Kashmir, the line changing conferring to the degree of threat perception from Russia . China never agreed to any of the boundary suggestions made during this period.
Start of Sino- India Border Dispute
After India’s independence in 1947, three major reasons contributed to the border dispute.
1. First was the unwillingness of both India and China to raise the subject in the initial phase from 1950 to 1957, when Sino-Indian ties were friendly and cordial and both countries had many high-level diplomatic interactions, which provided the leaders with plenty of occasions to settle the vagueness left over from the British colonial rulers. Nevertheless, the both countries not only avoided the border issue but on the other hand both followed individual policies. The Indian government failed to take China in confidence before asserting the forward-most posts in the eastern and western sectors ; it occupied Tawang in 1951; and it printed new maps reflecting India’s one-sided delineation, thinking China’s silence as tacit agreement. Nehru himself acknowledged in 1953 that even while India inherited the McMahon Line from the British Raj, he was not ready to raise the issue in case it rouse sleeping dogs . Correspondingly, Mao Zedong’s ordered, the People Republic of China followed a delay strategy, with China deciding to refrain from officially protesting against India’s one sided moves until they had strengthen their administration and military situation in Tibet, as China had started constructing the Xinjiang National Highway in 1951 which was completed in 1957 . Furthermore, during 1954 talks on Tibet, China chose to be quite on the issue of border configuration despite having the chance, and in 1956, when Nehru for the first time raised to the border question, Zhou Enlai proposed that the China would be ready to recognize the Mc Mahon Line .
2. The second reason for China's border clashes with India was Tibet's aforementioned particular circumstances. China's occupation of Tibet in 1950 gave rise to huge unrest in India, the Indian public finding China's action a security threat ,Nehru’s commitment to mediate between Lhasa and Beijing was regarded as an effort to interfere with China’s internal affairs by the Communists in India. The 1954 Panchsheel Agreement only provided partial relaxation of tensions, as China 's coercive practices to sinicize Tibet and additional clandestine aid to the unarmed Tibetan resistance kept it suspicious that each side was doing something sinister. In this context, the spontaneous 1959 Lhasa uprising served to further exacerbate antagonisms between China and the Dalai Lama, which hardened their respective stances on the disputed border . At the eruption of the insurrection, Beijing instantly held India accountable for stirring the violence. Though the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) swiftly crushed the revolt, the 14th Dalai Lama’s flight to India and his consequent grant of the sanctuary by New Delhi enraged the Chinese government and reinforced its belief about Indian malfeasance. An internal intelligence report even claimed that India had been complicit in provoking revolt in Tibet to force China into accepting India’s border claims. Therefore, Beijing focused strong criticism against Nehru, condemning him for currently imposing policies in Tibet. The strong propaganda attack shocked Nehru and shaped anxiety in New Delhi that China might now try to push through the disputed areas. At the military operational level, the PLA and the Indian army began to clash at different points, primarily in the eastern sector, and in August 1959, the first exchange of fire took place at Longju, NEFA, which significantly stuck relations . Simultaneously, an exchange of letters between Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru in September confirmed noteworthy resentment between the two leaders over the border dispute: China withdrew its past inclination to accept the McMahon Line and accused India of forcing China, and Nehru responded by asking the withdrawal of PLA from positions on the Indian side as a prerequisite to boundary talks.
Combining the effect of the first two reasons, the post-imperial dogmas concealed by the two countries added to the entrenchment of the border problem. While the delay policy and the Tibet crisis both underlined how the boundary disagreement had reached such a point that by the 1960 talks failed, eventually leading to a stalemate.
Sino-India war erupted in October 1962, People liberation Army launched a colossal aggressive attack across the entire disputed border. It was a short and swift operation that continued for a month and resulted in the comprehensive defeat of the Indian army . Nevertheless, the war failed to guarantee a enduring solution to the boundary disagreement. Instead, the political fissure that was formed lingers to reduce bilateral relations, especially in respect of border talks. We can easily conclude that the divergent positions held by India and China on the boundary disagreement have seen their differences progress and amplify in the post-war years.
India claims that the western sector was demarcated by the 1842 treaty between Tibet and Kashmir and that the eastern sector was settled by the Simla Treaty in 1913–1914. Therefore, no further delineation is essential. China in turn says that no proper agreement has ever been signed between the Indian and Chinese administrations, for China never sent any official for the India-Tibet talks nor endorsed the McMahon Line. China views the formation of the state of Arunachal Pradesh as a one-sided step by India, which is a result of the illegal occupation of China’s Tibet .
One more crucial area of disagreement between China and India is the demarcation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). India rubbishes the Chinese idea of the LAC, relating it as a series of disconnected ideas on the map. New Delhi also says that the LAC should be constructed on military positions held by both sides before 1962 war, disregarding any advances made during 1962 war .
China insists that the Line of Actual Control should be the status quo achieved after the 1962 war; which is by the way the territorial plan proposed by Zhou Enlai during the 1960 talks. On the eastern side, it overlaps mostly with the McMahon Line, while in the western and middle sectors, the LAC follows the old usual line pointed out by China. Nevertheless, China only designates it in general terms without exact scales on the map. Owing to such differences between the two states, the LAC, even after 50 years of conflict, remains vague.
After the 1962 war it took New Delhi and Beijing ten years to reestablish diplomatic ties, and post-normalization, the two nations were confronted with the twin challenge of deciding the border disagreement while at the same time preserving peace along the non-defined border.
The Indian FM, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, went to China in 1979 for trying to ease tensions in bilateral ties. Sino-Indian talks on boundary disagreement started in the 1980s. Nevertheless, confidence-building measures (CBM’s)were introduced only in the 1990s when boundary patrols of both forces had begun to clash again .
In 1981, boundary discussions started at the vice-ministerial level, and were shadowed by 7 more distinct rounds of consultations. Even though mutual ties worsened due to the military deadlock during the Sumdorong Chu crisis, nevertheless, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing turned out to be a decisive moment. The two countries approved to set up the Joint Working Group for the settlement of the border question with a twin order of guaranteeing peace and calmness along the LAC and working toward a fair, realistic and mutually suitable settlement of the border question . A major advance was attained in 1993, during P.V. Narasimha Rao’s visit to China. The two leaders signed an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility , which called for an abandonment of the policy of use of force, acknowledgment of and respect for the LAC, and the resolution of the boundary question through talks. Another high point of boundary disagreement management was reached with 1996 ratification of the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas . The pact laid down promises /agreements on non-aggression, prior notice of troop movements, and the exchange of maps to resolve disputes over the LAC. The two documents remained important in the framework of Sino-Indian boundary talks, because both India and China recognized that certain glitches occur in their border areas and that there is need for official instruments to solve these problems.
After these fruitful conclusion of these two pacts, China and India in June 2003 accepted the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Co-operation between India and China, according to it both sides decided to engage special representatives to discover ways for resolution of the boundary disagreement by keeping in view the political viewpoints of both countries . The Special Representative Dialogue apparatus has become one of the vital cooperation approaches in recent years, and through the Special Representative talks both China and India have reached a far-reaching agreement on outlining rules for the resolution of the border disagreement. A secondary instrument for the Special Representative Talks was introduced in 2012 in the form of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Co-ordination on India-China Boundary issues. This mechanism was particularly tasked to study and manage issues arising out of inflexibilities in the boundary areas .
An other important framework for resolution of the border dispute was introduced in 2005 with the signing of The Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of India-China Boundary Questions. In light of this protocol, China and India recognized the importance to start the process of early clarification and confirmation of the positions of the LAC along with taking meaningful and equally suitable changes to their corresponding positions on the boundary question.
Although both China and India have been able to prevent a major 1962-style confrontation the number of military intrusions by China has risen sharply, from 334 in 2014 to 606 in 2019 . military deadlocks between India and China have grown longer and more problematic to resolve; the 1987 Sumdorong Chu crisis continued for 8 months, the 2013 Daulat Beg Oldi standoff continued for a full month, the Doklam crisis in 2017 continued for 70 days, and the Galwan Valley military standoff led to military clashes; and the impasse continues. At the same time, local quarrels between PLA and Indian Army have inclined toward more ferocity, that is from fist fights and hurling stones, the armies of the two sides have resorted to more fierce actions including the use of clubs dotted with nails or enfolded with metal pointed wire .
China has policy of good relations with its neighbors. China has tried to mend relations with India and it concluded many border agreements with India but things changed when on 5th August 2019 ,India unilaterally Changed the status of Kashmir. It effected the areas on LAC. Jammu and Ladakh which were considered disputed areas and India has given the special status to the occupied Valley was made part of Union of India by altering the status que. Indian home minister claimed that India will take back Aksai Chin ,which is Part of China. Indian aggressive statements and actions forced China to take action which China did in April 2020. Indian Analysts and journalists claim that China is in procession of about 1800 KM of Indian territory at LAC’s Western Sector .
These examples point toward a lack of local-level communication and understanding, which continues amongst the background of diplomatic declarations of friendship and collaboration.
FUTURE OF SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE AND GAME THEORY
Game theory is an important theory in International relations, which allow us to understand decision making process. Game theory is also known as interactive decision theory. It studies the behavior of decision makers in situations of strategic interrelationship. Its initiators are John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern who published their book The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944.
The significance of the theory for international relations is undisputed; there is a saying which state that states interact by trying to predict other states’ reactions to their decisions.
Game-theory applications to IR take the form of models, that is, the simplification and stylization of states’ interactions. The are three levels of game theory. These levels are extensive, strategic, and coalitional forms. In an extensive-form model, the analysis is in terms of states presented as players, actions available to players, classifications of players’ actions, players’ information conditions and preferences, and, finally, outcomes of interactions.
In a game at the strategic level, there are nothing but players, players’ strategies and choices over outcomes. The coalitional form is the most intangible level of analysis: coalitions of players and the values of these coalitions.
The majority of IR game models are pitched at the first two levels, as the last level of analysis assumes that cooperation between players is binding. Yet if a state cooperates, it must do so only because of self-interest; not because of a higher authority above states enforcing cooperative agreements. At least, there is no supreme authority over sovereign and co-existing states.
There are two basic models in game theory
• Prisoners’ dilemma
• Game of Chicken
A prisoner's dilemma defines a situation where, according to game theory, two players acting selfishly will eventually result in a suboptimal choice for both. The prisoner's dilemma also shows us that mere cooperation is not always in one's best interests.
The game of chicken is a model of the struggle for two players in game theory. The belief of the game is that while the perfect result is for one player to profit (to evade the worst consequence if neither yields), the actors try to duck it out of arrogance for not wishing to look like a "chicken". Each actor taunts the other to raise the risk of shame in yielding. However, when one player profits, the conflict is evaded, and the game is for the most part over.
Prisoner Dilemma Model
Within the game theory, the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ is a model that deals with decision-making between two parties that are in rivalry but are not in communication with each other and henceforth cannot synchronize their choices. Thus, the prisoner’s dilemma is a the most useful tool for analyzing India-China relations about the border disagreements and helping us in evaluating the different choices both states can make as well as their own consequences.
Both India and China have 2 choices: either be antagonistic or negotiate an arrangement.
This results in the following four situations:
Case 1: India and China both choose to negotiate.
This is an equally advantageous choice for both India and China. Such an arrangement could be in the form of an international agreement where one nation readily gives up the area to the other. In the Sino-Russian border disagreement, Russia readily gave up the upriver end of Bear Island to China, which had an optimistic effect on Sino-Russian relations . Otherwise, the U.N. can arbitrate through several methods such as deploying peacekeepers , nonstop monitoring, and establishing international regulator. A diplomatic arrangement would result in better relations between India and China, which has the potential to lead to more trade agreements and foreign direct investment(FDI).
However, this result is not likely because of the “commitment problem,” which arises when two actors refuse to arrive at a mutually beneficial arrangement because they have dissimilar hopes for their future. In the case of the Sino-Indian border dispute, both believe they can garner control over the area in the future, ensuing in a commitment problem.
Case 2: India attempts to negotiate a pact while China becomes aggressive.
This situation favors aggressor .This will lead to total control of LAC at western sector, which includes Galwan valley area by the Chinese. India will never be in position to go on the offensive against the PLA along the border because without this strategic lead India will lose against PLA in most situations. China will gain a military advantage over Indian Army which will guarantee that China will maintain an upper hand compared to India. India will lose its position as an Asian counterbalance.
Case 3: India becomes aggressive while China tries to negotiate
This scenario is similar to case 2, this situation favors the aggressor. This will result in India controlling the Galwan Valley. China will become less hostile with India because of India’s obvious tactical military advantage. It will also help cementing India’s status as a counter-weight to China, India will get more FDI from the U.S. and West and improve international relations as well. But, given that China’s military and technological strength far outweighs that of India this outcome very unlikely.
Case 4: Both India and China become aggressive.
This is the least beneficial preposition for both sides. Both India and China, in an attempt to control Western Sector, become aggressive, giving rise to a bigger conflict regarding the area and breaking their international relations further. Both China and India will try to dissociate but India does not have the essential infrastructure to entirely replace PRC imports while Chinese corporations will lose millions of clients and billions of dollars of investment. This will be a lose-lose situation.
In spite of this, Case 4 is the equilibrium in this situation. This is because as established in cases 2 and 3, both states have many motivations to becoming aggressive with each other. If either nation does not act when the other country resorts to aggression, they will suffer hefty losses. Henceforth, case 2 and case 3 are very unlikely to happen and the only realistic scenario Should be case 4 but due to relatively less national power when compared to China . India is actually moving forward in between case 2 and 3.
India don’t want war with China over border crisis and that is the reason it has in past never tried to climb escalation ladder viz a viz China.
To understand Indian reaction here we will employ second game theory model
GAME OF CHICKEN
Game of chicken is a model of struggle for two players in game theory. The belief of the game is that while the perfect result is for one player to profit (to evade the worst consequence if neither yields), the actors try to duck it out of arrogance for not wishing to look like a "chicken". Each actor taunts the other to raise the risk of shame in yielding. However, when one player profits, the conflict is evaded, and the game is for the most part over.
India is attributed to the Chicken Game with respect to how it does not offer reprisals to Chinese aggression. China is 2nd biggest world economy; many times advance in elements of national power when compared to India. There is no match between Indian and Chinese military, technological and economic capabilities. Political system of PRC is quicker in decision making as its one party rule where as India has parliamentary system and MLA’s come from different states with different ethnic and cultural back grounds.
At one side India sides with US alliance against China and is member of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and actively participate in military exercises with Quads countries like US, Japan and Australia which are directed towards PRC , it also follow hostile policies against China on international forums. On other hand same China is a 2nd biggest trading partner of India and in 2022 mutual trade exceeded 115.49 Billion US dollars.
India ducks it heads when there is chances of Clash. At the time of 2020 Galwan clash India tried to play down the clash. Indian PM Narinder Modi refused to admit that China was in procession of 1800 KM of Indian territory in western sector of LAC. Similarly, Modi government tried to hide the Tawang Clash of Eastern Sector on 9th December 2022. It took 2 days to come up with Information .
CONCLUSION
India China border dispute has roots in history. India less powerful will never want war with china which will end like 1962 humiliating defeat. Like in prisoner dilemma it don’t trust China but on other hand have fake pride but like in Game of Chicken it at one side try to play in anti-China alliances to save its pride but when clash become necessary for its territorial integrity, it prefers to avoid and ducks out.
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