ABSTRACT.
In ancient Greece Armies, before going to war, used to pay respect to Athena, who was the Greek goddess of wisdom, strategy, and warfare. The Athenians believed that Athena would offer them strategic guidance and protect them in battle. In contrast, Ares, who was the god of war and bloodlust was ignored. The Athenians believed that invoking Ares would bring them victory, but at the cost of more bloodshed and brutality. Therefore, they preferred wisdom from Athena because historical experience had taught them that war is won primarily with wisdom, whereas emotionalism and bloodlust only result in a Pyrrhic victory. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan has experienced a high level of terrorist violence and attacks for many years, including before and after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The violence in KPK is primarily linked to the ongoing conflict between the Pakistani government and various militant groups, including TTP and other extremist organizations. Although the US withdrawal from Afghanistan may have some impact on the situation in KPK, it is not the sole cause of the violence there. The conflict in KPK has deep roots, including historical grievances, ethnic and sectarian tensions, and ongoing struggles over political power and resources. In recent years, the Pakistani government has taken steps to address the violence in KPK, including increased military operations and efforts to promote peace talks with militant groups. However, the situation in the province remains volatile, and ongoing violence and instability continue to pose a significant challenge. Multipolarity in the global order is becoming visible day by day. China and Russia are coordinating policies and are working together to replace the US-dominated global order. Central and Euro Asia are strategically very important to competing powers. This has restarted a great game in the region in which Pakistan and Afghanistan are on one side victims and on the other are getting pitched against each other. Due to the surge in terrorism, the Pakistani establishment is being forced to launch /target TTP positions in Afghanistan. Taliban who are themselves under pressure due to the financial crisis coupled with ISKP attacks are not taking any action against TTP. In this essay, we will use Game Theory and the prisoner dilemma model to find out what can be the best policy for Pakistan to achieve its objectives.
Introduction
Since the withdrawal of US and
ISAF from Afghanistan and come back of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in Power
in August 2021, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks have increased in
border and settled areas in Pakistan. After attacks in bordering areas, the TTP
has also now expanded its attacks to include settled areas of KPK. December 18,
2022, TTP attack on a Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) compound in Bannu Cantonment
was a case that particularly alarmed the Pakistani government. It took the
security forces two days to clear the compound, leading to the deaths of 3
members of the security forces and 25 militants((The Express Tribune, June 20,
2022)[i].
The TTP terror
attack on the CTD office, though, was not the first attack of its kind that
unfolded in a post-withdrawal of international forces. There is a long history
and trajectory of actions that led to it.
TTP relation with the IEA has provided the TTP
with assets and sanctuary in Afghanistan. Then due to War against terrorism
damages to infrastructure and inhabitants during operations, there is also a
wave of Pashtun nationalism which is favoring TTP.
Then there is a lack of Pakistani governments
writ in former FATA or the tribal areas, especially in the North Waziristan
Agency (NWA) and South Waziristan Agency (SWA), providing the TTP with space
and environment to organize and launch terror attacks. Prior to the fall of
Kabul, the US-installed Afghan government was not interested in taking any
action against TTP due to its adverse relations with Pakistan. Now, with the IEA
in charge and keeping a close bond with TTP, which helped IEA in its fight
against International forces, Pakistan is facing additional challenges in fighting
the TTP’s (Dawn, October 8, 2022)[ii].
Fall of Kabul
was a significant victory not only for the Afghan Taliban but also for TTP. US
chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan has emboldened IEA and TTP. As a result,
the TTP has started believing that it, too, can easily defeat Pakistani
government into submission to enforce their version of sharia (Terrorism
Monitor, November 4, 2022)[iii]
Backdoor
negotiations between the Pakistani government and Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan,
which were facilitated by the IEA provided some relief to TTP by allowing the
group to operate in Swat with government consent, although this caused outrage
among civilians in the area(Terrorism Monitor, November 4, 2022)[iv].
The Pakistani administration’s over-emphasis on talks also created a sense of
confidence in TTP. This has stimulated the TTP to make more rigorous demands from
the government, such as withdrawing from the decision to merger the FATA with
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and release its cadre from prisons(The Express Tribune,
December 20, 2022)[v].
Moreover, the long period of the talks has given Tehrik e Taliban , a chance to
re-organize its activities(Dawn, October 8, 2022)[vi]. Sadly, even after the talks with the TTP
failed, the government failed to take any retributive actions against the TTP which
is perceived as weakness by terror outfit.
U.S. defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan
had a noteworthy effect on the TTP’s terror. During U.S. troop’s occupation IEA was busy in
fighting occupiers and IEA was not in a position to give backing to TTP. The ISAF
and U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan provided an opportunity for the TTP, which
led to their regrouping and attacks across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa(Dawn, October 8,
2022)[vii].
Contrary to
belief IEA do not exercise total control over TTP.In 2009, IEA Amir Mullah
Muhammad Omer, through a decree, asked TTP not to attack Pakistani targets(Khan,2023)[viii]
but ignored the call.
The fundamental
difference between IEA and TTP ideology is that the former has the national
agenda whereas the latter follows Takfir(Jadoon,2021)[ix] TTP’s ideology is nearer to Al Qaida and ISKP
than to the Taliban of IEA. ISKP cadre in Afghanistan largely consists of
defectors from TTP. The latter fact creates a dilemma for the Taliban. At a
moment when IEA is facing lots of difficulties due to economic and internal
reasons, they cannot exercise pressure beyond a limit because pressure can
force TTP elements to join ISKP and create troubles which IEA can cause pyrrhic victory for them.
Then there is a
problem of sub-nationalism prevailing in Afghanistan.Due to pressure from
regional countries Panjshir insurgency went underground , similarly anti IEA
forces like Gen Dostam , Gen Atta Muhammad, Ahmed Masood, etc. still have
considerable influence in their ethnic groups. In addition, ISKP has conducted
some bold terrorist attacks in Kabul, including an attack near the Gulbadin
Hikmat Yar office in the capital(Express Tribune, Dec 22,2022)[x].
Taliban lack resources to manage all
On other side,
there is growing Pashtun nationalism due to PTM propaganda which is exploiting
Pashtun sentiments. TTP is gaining ground. The state of Pakistan is facing a
serious threat and its leadership is blaming Afghanistan. There is also
American pressure and propaganda instigating the Pakistani administration to
take action. The growing incidents of attacks on Pakistani territory and
officials, the worst economic and political conditions coupled with changing
global bipolarity, and the US policy of carrot and stick to force Pakistan into
submission in order to get economic relief has created a dilemma for Pakistani
policymakers.
Then there are
historical biases and disagreements like the Durand line and the history of
hostile Pak-Afghan relations which are adding fire to distrust.
In this
article, we will look at the present relationship between the Afghan government
and Pakistan and apply the game theory’s model of Prisoner dilemma to predict
what is the most favorable way to come out of the situation so that it is a
win-win for both countries.
PAK- AFGAN AND
PAK- IEA RELATIONS
Historically
Pak Afghan relations were tense, except during Taliban rule in Afghanistan
before the 911 attack on the US. Afghanistan was the only country that opposed
Pakistan’s entry into U.N (UNGA 2nd Session , Sep30,1947)[xi].
Various Afghan regimes tried to instigate Pashtun nationalism and refused to
accept the Durand line as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
After Pakistani independence in 1947, Afghanistan immensely
supported and instigated armed secessionist movement of Faqir of Ippi in
South Waziristan Agency of Pakistan’s tribal area(Hafeez,2016)[xii].
In 1952, Afghanistan published a tract in which it laid claim
not only to the Pashtun area within KPK and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan(Hilali,2017)[xiii]. Diplomatic
relations were cut off between 1961 and 1963 after Afghanistan supported more
armed secessionists in Pakistan, leading to clashes between the Afghan and
Pakistani Army in 1960. During this period Pakistan closed its port
of Karachi to Afghan transit trade (Weisburd,1997)[xiv].
In 1973 Mohammed Daoud Khan became President of
Afghanistan and with Soviet support and pursued a strategy of instigating
and arming Pashtun separatists within Pakistan (Fair ,2015)[xv].
After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan became a front-line
state against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. During this era, Pakistan-supported
resistance forces or Mujahedeen in return, Soviet intelligence agency KGB and Afghan agency Khad conducted numerous
terrorist bomb blasts in Pakistan.
After the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan pro-Soviet regime
soon fell and the Mujahideen factions started fighting each other, The era of the
Afghan civil war ended in 1996. The ethnic civil war created an environment of
disorder in Afghanistan which resulted in the rise of the Taliban movement in
Afghanistan.
Pakistan was the first country that recognized Taliban followed
by UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, the Taliban refused to ratify the Durand Line
notwithstanding pressure from Pakistani authorities, Taliban claiming that
there shall be no borders among Muslims(Roashan,2001)[xvi].
An argument over the Durand Line between Mullah Mohammed
Omar and Pakistan’s interior minister
Naseerullah Babar ended abruptly. Mullah Omar
called the Pakistani minister, himself a Pashtun, a traitor for saying that
"all problems would be resolved" should the Durand Line be recognized
by the Taliban government(Dawn, Apr 26, 2019).[xvii]
When the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan was toppled and the new Afghan government was formed, President
Hamid Karzai began repeating the previous Taliban statement "A line of
hatred that raised a wall between the two brothers(Harrison,2019)[xviii].
US and ISAF relied on Northern Alliance an
anti-Taliban resistance consisting of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Hazaras, and
Pashtuns for ousting the Taliban regime.
After the toppling of the
Taliban, these groups who had biases against the Taliban and ethnic Pashtuns
started the era of prosecution of Pashtuns. Taliban movement was a Pashtun
religious movement. After their ouster, common Pashtuns were targeted due to
their resemblance to the Taliban. Thousands of Pashtuns were tortured by non-Pashtun
warlords who after the Taliban downfall became Afghan government officials (Dorronsoro,
2009)[xix]. Then non-Pashtuns who
were dominating the post-Taliban government were deputed to Pashtun areas
resulting in resentment in Pashtuns. Pashtuns who celebrated on Taliban ouster
soon started joining Taliban resistance and due to the conduct of US forces ,
ISAF and the installed government Taliban movement became Pashtun National
Movement(Asia Times ,Bilal,2009)[xx]
During 20 years of US occupation,
both US and Afghan regimes accused Pakistan of providing safe havens to Afghan
Taliban. Every failure was attributed to the Pakistani deep state. During this
period Haqqani network and Quetta shura became the topics of discourse in
western media and think tanks. Pakistani state which opted to side with US ,
suffered immense economic losses during this period. According to data
published by the finance division of Pakistan in 2017(MoF Pakistan,2017)[xxi]
In addition to economic costs
Pakistan,in the words of ex-prime minister Imran Khan “More than 70,000 Pakistanis were killed.
While the US provided $20 billion in aid, losses to the Pakistani economy have
exceeded $150 billion(Arab News, 2021,Sep 12).[xxii]
In 2009 Pakistan Army started
large scale operations against TTP. Coincidently during the same period, US and
ISAF left their positions in the Kunar and Nooristan provinces of Afghanistan.
This gave TTP space to relocate their bases to rest, regroup and conduct
attacks from sanctuaries in Afghanistan(Khan, 2014)[xxiii]
Latter on the same provinces
bordering Northern KPK and near China border became bases of Anti-China terror
outfits and ISKP.
After US withdrawal Taliban tried
to mediate between TTP and Pakistani State. A ceasefire was announced on June
22 between TTP and Pakistan but soon it failed as TTP used it to regroup and
infiltrate. TTP has increased attacks on law-enforcing personnel in KPK and
former FATA. As TTP has safe heavens in
Afghanistan , the state of Pakistan is asking IEA to control them. On the other
hand recent clashes between IEA and Pakistani troops at Chaman border has
contributed in threat perception on both sides. As discussed earlier Taliban don’t
recognize the Durand line. The recent clash on 15 December 2022 , started when
the Pakistani side started fencing Jahangir and Luqman villages(Pajhwok,2017
May 2009)[xxiv]
on the Durand line resulting in IEA troops opening fire.
GAME THEORY AND PAK-AFGHAN
RELATIONS
Game theory is an important theory in International relations, which
allow us to understand decision making process. Game theory is
also known as interactive decision theory. It studies the behavior of decision
makers in situations of strategic interrelationship. Its initiators are John
Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern who published their book The Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior in 1944.
The significance of the theory for international relations is undisputed;
there is a saying which state that states interact by trying to predict
other states’ reactions to their decisions.
Game-theory applications to IR take the form of models, that is, the
simplification and stylization of states’ interactions. The are three levels of
game theory. These levels are extensive, strategic, and coalitional forms. In
an extensive-form model, the analysis is in terms of states presented as
players, actions available to players, classifications of players’ actions,
players’ information conditions and preferences, and, finally, outcomes of
interactions.
In a game at the strategic level,
there are nothing but players, players’ strategies and choices over outcomes.
The coalitional form is the most intangible level of analysis: coalitions of
players and the values of these coalitions.
The majority of IR game models are pitched at the first two levels, as
the last level of analysis assumes that cooperation between players is binding.
Yet if a state cooperates, it must do so only because of self-interest; not
because of a higher authority above states enforcing cooperative agreements. At
least, there is no supreme authority over sovereign and co-existing states.
There are two basic models in game theory
· Prisoners’ dilemma
· Game of Chicken
A prisoner's dilemma defines a situation where, according to game
theory, two players acting selfishly will eventually result in a suboptimal
choice for both. The prisoner's dilemma also shows us that mere cooperation is
not always in one's best interests.
According to game Theory Pakistan and IEA have 4 options
1.
Let the status quo prevail
2.
Pakistan retaliates and IEA remains Passive
3.
Pakistan Ask China and Russia to pressurize IEA and opt
carrot and stick policy
4.
Pakistan and Afghanistan both become aggressive
Option 1 will benefit TTP and the state of Pakistan will have to suffer therefore
this option is not viable for Pakistan, although IEA will like this option due
to internal pressures that it is facing.
Option 2 , this option is not possible as IEA as it will dent its
prestige. Taliban will never allow Afghans to believe that IEA is weak in front
of Pakistan. This option may unite all extremist forces and ethnic groups
against Pakistan and will result in pyrrhic victory or regional ethnic conflict
Option 3 is the best option for Pakistan. Pakistan should bring China
and other regional neighbors in. Taliban are longing for recognition and its
China and Russia which are helping them in their economic and political crisis.
Pakistan must understand the vulnerabilities of IEA and incentivize IEA in
taking actions against TTP. Before the regime change, Pakistan was heading
towards regional integration and all Afghan neighbors were coordinating with
each other but regime change altered the dynamics and at present neighbors
perceive that the Pakistani government is towing the US line. Pakistan has the
world’s largest Pashtun population, they are the second largest ethnic group
after Punjabi. Disturbance in Afghanistan have negative impacts on Pakistan
therefore Pakistan should only consider its own national interest.
Option 4 is very dangerous. It can tactically unite ISKP, TTP, and anti
Pakistani Tajik and Uzbeks against Pakistan. This have the potential to create
balkanization in Af-Pak.
CONCLUSION
Pakistan and Afghanistan have conflicting relations throughout history.
At one hand Afghan regimes displayed hostility against Pakistan, on other
people of both countries considered each other as brothers. Pakistan must
realize IEA Dilemma and vice versa. Both must not allow spoilers to ruin their
relations. Friends can be changed but neighbors cannot be changed.
[i] The
Express Tribune, December 20, 2022
[ii] Dawn,
October 8, 2022
[iv]
Op Cit, Terrorism Monitor, November 4, 2022
[v] The Express Tribune, June 20, 2022
[vi] Dawn,
December 8, 2022
[vii] Dawn,
December 4, 2022
[viii]
Lt Gen®Tariq Khan , global village space , 24 Jan 2023 ,
https://www.globalvillagespace.com/gvs-exclusive-gen-retd-tariq-khan-discusses-ttp-resurgence-the-way-forward/
[ix] Amira
Jadoon,the Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,
May 2021, United States Institute of peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/sr_494-the_evolution_and_potential_resurgence_of_the_tehrik_i_taliban_pakistan.pdf
[x]
Express Tribune ,22 Dec 2022
[xi] "General Assembly, 2nd session: 92nd
plenary meeting, held in the General Assembly Hall at Flushing Meadow, New
York, on Tuesday". 30 September 1947.
[xii] Malik,
Hafeez (27 July 2016). Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics,
1947–92. Springer.
[xiii]
Hilali, A. Z. (5 July 2017). US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan. Taylor & Francis
[xiv] Weisburd,
Arthur Mark (25 April 1997). Use of Force: The Practice of States Since World
War II. Penn State Press
[xv] Fair,
C. Christine; Watson, Sarah J. (18 February 2015). Pakistan's Enduring
Challenges. University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN 9780812246902.
[xvi] Dr. G. Rauf Roashan ,The Unholy Durand Line,
Buffering the Buffer, Institute of Afghan Studies ,August 11, 2001
[xvii]
Arwin Rahi, Do the Afghan Taliban and
Pakistan get on as well as some think? Dawn. April 27,
[xviii]
Selig S. Harrison, Pakistan's Ethnic Fault Line the Washington Post. May 11,
2009.
[xix] https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf
[xx]
Muhammad Bilal Iftikhar Khan, US Runs into Pashtun resistance, Asia Times,8
December 2009
[xxi] https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_17/Annex_IV_War.pdf
[xxii]
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1927131/world
[xxiii]
Simbal Khan , THE ENDGAME IN AFGHANISTAN: U.S./NATO STRATEGY AND ITS
IMPACT ON PAKISTAN’S SECURITY, June 2014 , https://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1299560331_6509170.pdf
[xxiv]
https://pajhwok.com/2017/05/09/joint-survey-villages-near-durand-line-launched/