Muhammad Bilal Iftikhar Khan
War is a extension
of politics by other means, without diplomacy and peaceful means, and with
violence filling the void. It is a battle of wills in which the stronger party
imposes its will on the weaker one, either because of its resources,
determination, or its strategy.
The Cambridge
Dictionary defines politics as "the activities of the government, members
of law-making organizations, or people who try to influence the way a country
is governed. From this definition, war is the conflict between the elites of
one state and another. This is a Eurocentric paradigm, however, and not
universal. Clausewitz defined war as "the extension of the activities of
government, lawmakers, or those who want to influence the government , through
violent means.
The Eurocentric
approach has grown out of the development from the Dark Ages to the
Enlightenment, influenced by the mercantilist practices and liberal
conclusions. Western civilization is materialistic, and that is reflected in
the aims of warfare. For instance, the Napoleonic Wars and both World Wars were
not only about winning the war, but also about the economic and systemic
restructuring of Europe. Similarly, the colonial argument is based on this, colonization was an ontological and epistemic
basis, which resulted in systems where materialism was the norm under
colonialism. This norm was preserved even after decolonization. For instance,
in Africa and South Asia, post-colonial boundaries are still producing
conflicts, such as the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan, or ethnic
conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The Islamic
notion of war, however, is quite different. The prevailing paradigm is not
"house of war" (Dar al-Harb), but rather "Jihad". The use
of jihad as armed struggle is strictly controlled: the state must declare war,
offer peace first, protect non-combatants and not destroy crops or trees.
Attrition is not valued because war is not an extension of politics. Politics
(siyasa) is justice in the government of the Muslims. War is a religious duty
when it comes to defense, protection of dhimmi (non-Muslim protected peoples)
or rescuing the oppressed. For instance, the treaties of Umar (Razi Allah Anhu)
with Christian communities and the
actions of Saladin during the Crusades, which granted safe passage and spared
civilians, are examples of this normative, exception-based perspective. War is
not a means; loot is a side effect. Elite will is not enough and war should be
declared by a legitimate caliph or sultan. Peace is the norm, war is the
exception. There is no "continuation of politics by other means.
The Chinese
term, Quansheng (complete victory), is also unique. It does not believe in the
attrition approach of the West, which preaches war as a last resort and a sign
of failed virtue, but rather war as a means of continuing politics. War is not
about forcing but restoring harmony. For instance, Sun Tzu's The Art of War
states that "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the highest of all
arts. The Korean War (1950-1953) was fought defensively by modern China, with
the goal of restoring stability in the region rather than expanding its
territory. This is the philosophy that guided the PLA in the Sino-Indian War of
1962, when they withdrew after a hard lesson, rather than occupying land.
The Indian
(Hindu) idea of war is more similar to the European one. Here, attrition is
often sought, and kings are urged to play realpolitik. For instance, Kautilya's
Arthashastra explicitly approves espionage, assassination and attack on enemies
when they are weak. The Mahabharata war, though presented as a dharma war, is
one of total destruction, in which the rules are broken over and over again. In
modern times, India's war against Pakistan in 1971, which was deliberately
designed to split Pakistan into two, and the Siachen Glacier occupation are
examples of such operations, which are high attrition.
These three
paradigms shape the character of war. European philosophy calls war an
extension of politics and a clash of will. Islam does not consider war an
exception of the will of the elite, but an exception of divine law. In China,
war is a failure of politics. Realism for Hindu civilization is the lived
reality in the European sense. For instance, in the 1962 war with India, the
Chinese PLA has repeatedly demonstrated superior strategy, and has been more
effective in strategic thinking than the Indian and European approaches in
several instances.
Clausewitz is
correct for post-Westphalian Europe. He's just a local guy. He is a must-read
for students of strategic and war studies, but only if they are able to find
their own philosophical roots to balance out Eurocentric doctrines.
