By Muhammad Bilal Iftikhar Khan
21/3/26
The Middle East and adjacent regions are passing through
an exceptionally sensitive period, particularly following US and Israeli
aggression against Iran. From Sudan to South Asia, fault lines that have long
lain dormant now appear activated. In this volatile environment, information
and propaganda efforts are intensifying, aimed at instigating disruptions,
especially against countries that stand as obstacles to what some describe as
the Zionist world order. Sentiments run high across the region, and this
emotional charge is galvanizing misinterpretations and hacking public
perceptions. When reality is constructed on the basis of emotion rather than
fact, it often creates more problems than it solves. In such moments, even
intellectual leaders become vulnerable; and when those who shape public
understanding lose their footing, that vulnerability becomes a grave liability
for the nation.
A case in point is the recent meeting between Pakistan's
Chief of defense forces/ Chief of Army Staff and religious scholars (Ulema). A
segment of commentators, some knowingly, others as victims of black propaganda,
has interpreted this meeting as signaling Pakistan's intention to join
aggression against Iran at the behest of Saudi Arabia. This interpretation has
no basis in observable evidence, yet it has gained traction, even among
otherwise perceptive analysts who, in an impulsive reaction, have set aside
rational analysis. This matters because those with intellectual influence bear
a responsibility to verify facts before speaking; their words shape public
perception, and in a region already primed for conflict, careless commentary
can have real-world consequences.
It is worth understanding how policy shifts are typically
prepared. When a state contemplates a significant change in foreign policy,
there is usually a deliberate effort to create a foundation, to shape
perceptions so that decisions, when they come, appear necessary and natural.
This process, known as securitization, involves the state using the instruments
at its disposal to feed interpreted facts to the public, gradually molding
opinion. If Pakistan were genuinely preparing to turn against Iran, we would
expect to see such an effort underway. Yet to this day, no quarter of the state
apparatus has engaged in such groundwork. On the contrary, the latest interview
of Senator Mushahid Hussain, conducted by the Islamabad Policy Research
Institute, offers a window into the thinking of Pakistan's strategic elite. In
that interview, Hussain articulated a position grounded in de-escalation,
strategic autonomy, and the importance of maintaining brotherly ties with Iran.
His views are not personal; they reflect a broader consensus within Pakistan's
foreign policy and military establishments.
Further evidence lies in the posture of Pakistan's media.
Media landscapes are never entirely monolithic, but in recent weeks, the
dominant tone across Pakistani news outlets has been one of sympathy for Iran
and concern over regional escalation. If the state were quietly steering the
country toward confrontation with Iran, it would be counterproductive to allow
a media environment that actively undermines such a shift. The absence of any
coordinated media campaign to vilify Iran or prepare the public for conflict
speaks volumes.
To understand Pakistan's likely course of action, one
must recognize a fundamental principle: in modern states, national interest is
supreme. Ruling elites may construct narratives according to their ideological
inclinations, and governments may for political reasons create convenient
realities, but the state as an enduring institution ultimately pursues what it
perceives to be its core interests. This is not idealism; it is observable
behavior. Pakistan became a nuclear power despite sustained pressure and
sanctions from the United States and the West. The state developed its missile
arsenal regardless of whether superpowers approved. Last year, Pakistan faced
and defeated an adversary many times larger and more influential, acting
without yielding to external pressure. In each case, the state did what it
judged necessary for survival and sovereignty.
This institutional continuity is worth reflecting upon.
As Shakespeare wrote, "Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown."
Those who wear the crown, who bear the responsibility of state power, derive
that authority from the state itself. And the state, in turn, rests upon the
people. No state can long act against the wishes of its own masses, nor can it
afford to disregard the objective realities of its geopolitical position. For
Pakistan, those realities include a long and porous border with Iran,
significant bilateral trade, deep historical and sectarian ties, and a shared
interest in regional stability. Any policy that would transform Iran from a
neighbor into an adversary would contradict these fundamentals.
It is therefore essential to be sensitive to the dangers
of emotional reasoning. When analysis is driven by emotion rather than a sober
examination of ground realities , and by ground realities I mean the full
picture, not a selection of facts that confirm pre-existing beliefs , the
result is often misguided. Pakistan is the only Muslim country possessing
nuclear weapons and a state-of-the-art armed forces. This unique position makes
it a target. The Indo-Israeli nexus, viewing a strong Pakistan as an obstacle
to its vision of regional order, has every incentive to weaken it through misinformation,
disinformation, and what may be called perception hacking. Indeed, Pakistan has
been subjected to a hybrid war for decades. If the Pakistani public begins to
distrust its own state, its military, its institutions, its collective capacity
to defend national interests, then the enemy will have achieved its objective
without firing a shot.
This is not to argue against questioning the ruling
elite. Accountability for excesses, vigilance against overreach, and critical
scrutiny of those in power are essential features of a healthy polity. But
there is a difference between holding power accountable and succumbing to
propaganda designed to erode trust in the state itself. To lose that
distinction is to become a participant in one's own weakening.
In the end, the question is one of method. Are we
analyzing events based on all available realities, official statements,
institutional behavior, media posture, historical precedent, and geopolitical
constraints, or are we allowing ourselves to be swept up by narratives that
appeal to emotion but lack foundation? The stakes are high. In a region already
burning, the last thing any nation needs is to be set ablaze from within by its
own failure to think clearly. Pakistan has weathered far greater storms by
holding fast to its sovereign interests and trusting in the resilience of its
institutions and people. There is no reason to abandon that approach now.