By : Muhammad Bilal Iftikhar Khan
As the saying goes, “The finest quality of time is its capacity for change, evolution is the hidden face of time.” This truth has shaped Iran’s modern history. In 1979, revolution swept the country, ending the pro-Western monarchy and sending the Shah into exile.
The Pahlavi regime was, in many ways, a manifestation of coloniality, a product of Western modernity that deeply influenced the ruling family and Iranian elite. History might have taken a different course had the monarchy learned from the popular movement that brought Mohammad Mosaddegh to power in the early 1950s. Timely reform could have produced lasting stability. Instead, a foreign-backed counter-revolution imposed a fragile “negative peace,” which ultimately collapsed in the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
The revolutionaries did not arrive unprepared. They carefully studied the existing state structure and strategic culture before constructing new institutions in their place. This foundational overhaul dismantled Shah era systems and established what they perceived as a bulwark against “micro-level coloniality”, the subtle cultural, political, and ideological influences of the West.
Today, Iran’s resilience lies in this political and administrative architecture. Parallel revolutionary institutions now overshadow inherited ones: the Basij militia exercises wider social reach than the regular police, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) wields greater power than the Artesh, the national army. By design, these bodies function as instruments of regime preservation and political control.
From the outset, the West interpreted the revolution not merely as an uprising against the Shah, but as a rejection of Western civilization itself. Shaped by liberal biopolitical assumptions, this reading framed Iran’s transformation as a civilizational challenge. Consequently, decades of sanctions, hostility, and perceived conspiracies have hardened both the resolve and insecurities of Iran’s post-revolutionary elite.
This historical experience has produced a strategic culture deeply distrustful of the West. At the same time, collective memory of the Shah’s era discourages most Iranians from seeking royal restoration. Although the majority of citizens are ethnically Persian, significant minority communities remain alienated from the religious establishment. It is also important to recall that the anti-Shah movement was ideologically diverse, including socialist groups such as the Mujahideen-e Khalq and Fadayeen-e Khalq, many of whom now oppose the Islamic Republic from exile, sometimes in coordination with Western governments.
Continuous sanctions have imposed severe hardships on ordinary Iranians. While the West has benefited politically from the suffering generated by economic pressure, Iran’s long civilizational history has fostered societal resilience and strategic awareness. Sanctions create vulnerabilities, but they also encourage self-reliance and diversification. In this context, China has emerged as a crucial alternative partner, offering economic channels that mitigate isolation.
There was a time, particularly in the early post-revolutionary years, when Tehran appeared vulnerable. Even in recent years, key partners such as Russia have shown hesitation, for example, Russian air defenses in Syria failed to protect Iranian forces multiple times against Israeli attacks than many times Russia gave impression that Iran irritated it. However, the global shift toward multipolarity has repositioned Iran as a central regional actor. Its strategic geography, entrenched distrust of the West, the Ukraine war, and Western support for Israel have made Tehran increasingly valuable to both China and Russia.
China’s role in the Middle East has largely been that of a pragmatic stabilizer and mediator. The Saudi-Iran rapprochement, facilitated by Beijing, has altered regional dynamics and reduced immediate tensions, even if underlying rivalries persist.
In recent years, Iran has faced multiple tests. Israeli and American pressure challenged it externally, while domestic protests tested state authority internally, and the system endured. Meanwhile, as U.S. influence fluctuates in regions such as Latin America and the Middle East, China and Russia appear more willing to deepen strategic cooperation with Tehran. Washington increasingly recognizes that a full-scale war with Iran would be Pyrrhic. Nevertheless, driven by political survival and right-wing nationalism, leaders such as Netanyahu may still pursue confrontation.
A comprehensive war remains unlikely in the near term. Instead, Western and Israeli strategy is likely to emphasize targeted pressure: intelligence operations, cyber warfare, economic manipulation, and efforts to fracture elite cohesion. The coming phase will be a contest of endurance and influence rather than conventional military confrontation.
Iran’s revolutionary system was designed precisely to withstand such pressures. Whether it can adapt to internal social change and external transformation without collapsing will determine not only Iran’s future, but also the next chapter of Middle Eastern geopolitics.