The word "strategy" comes from “strategos”, which means "divine spark." This spark blesses one with the art of stratagem, a plan or scheme used to outwit an opponent. This “strategos” isn't something innate; it requires constant training and effort to acquire. While we humans are naturally programmed for tactics, which is the art of using what we have to get what we want, the scope of “strategos” and stratagem operates on a much higher plane.
The ancient Greeks understood this distinction. Before war, they went to the temple of Athena, even though their god of war was Ares. They knew that victory was the product of “strategos” and stratagem, in simpler terms, wisdom, not of rashness or a mere display of power.
When I was young, I was fascinated by the novels of Naseem Hijazi. I still remember a quote from one of his books: "The use of force is the first weakness of the powerful." Later, during my Masters in Diplomacy and Strategic Studies, I had the opportunity to study Sun Tzu and his indirect approach. I was amazed by his ideas on power.
The great Chinese philosopher and strategist Sun Tzu advocated that "the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting." This is the ultimate expression of strategic power. Why waste resources, risk lives, and create lasting enmity in a battle when you can achieve your objectives through diplomacy, deception, and psychological dominance? This is the core of the "divine spark", winning through wisdom, not slaughter.
Sun Tzu observed that a commander who relies on constant battles, the way of Ares, is not truly skilled, no matter how many they win. They are expending their nation's strength. The truly skilled strategist, following the way of Athena, wins so decisively in the planning and positioning phase that the enemy is compelled to yield. This is only possible when true power is derived from knowledge, not just from numbers or weapons. This strategic spark requires self-awareness and intelligence.
As a student of International Relations, I've observed that in real politics, realist paradigms often take the lead, and attrition becomes a favorite tool for policymakers. This is especially true in an anarchic system where power defines the structure and the security dilemma naturally results in conflicts and wars.
This is where Clausewitz helps us, providing the link between war and political policy when he says war is merely the continuation of policy by other, violent means. This helps us understand that every war starts for a reason, to achieve ends defined by political policy. It also hints at the stratagem needed to tackle an issue and the tactics required to achieve those policy objectives.
The history of Pakistan-Afghan relations is one built on tragedy. Both nations follow the same religion, share the same heroes, dilemmas, likes, and dislikes, yet they remain divided by colonial legacies and west centric idea of Statehood that neither has been able to navigate easily.
It began with the Durand Line; a border created during colonial rule that Pakistan inherited from the British as its de facto and de jure boundary. Unable to match British power then, or Pakistani power now, Afghanistan started its relationship with Pakistan by opposing its entry into the UN. Having failed there, they infiltrated proxies to stir unrest among Pashtuns in the name of "Pashtunistan," a effort that failed when the world's largest Pashtun population, residing on the eastern side of the Durand Line, came forward to defend Pakistan and refused to buy Afghan narrative .
Throughout history, successive Afghan regimes have supported and instigated trouble in Baluchistan and present-day KPK with help of India. Although Pakistan provided Afghans with shelter, food, and jobs during the Soviet-Afghan War, unlike other neighbors, this aid was often taken for granted.
After 9/11, given its relative power, Pakistan had little choice but to side with the US and the international community. Even during this challenging time for its own existence and security, Pakistan continued to help Afghan refugees. Yet, the successive Western-backed regimes in Afghanistan chose to play into Indian hands, a policy that resulted in over 80,000 Pakistani deaths and billions of dollars in damage.
Pakistan was ally of the West, yet there was scarcely a moment when they failed to level accusations at Pakistan. Still, Pakistan, helped the Afghans. In 2021, when the US and ISAF left, Pakistan hoped the dominant Pashtun regime, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), would help it control the Indian proxies that had been created, financed, and trained under the previous regimes to stir trouble in KPK and Baluchistan. Unfortunately, the IEA soon showed its true colors, leading to this new surge of hostilities and a war like situation on the Durand Line.
Nearly a week has passed since the clashes began. The IEA claims to have defeated three superpowers of their time, the British, the Soviets, and the West, and is now confident it can defeat Pakistan. The irony for IEA is that these were occupying powers, and the Afghans defeated them on their home turf using guerrilla tactics, never fighting pitched battles. This model doesn't easily apply to a conflict on the Durand Line, as Pakistan has no motive to occupy Afghanistan, and pitched battles are beyond IEA’s capabilities.
The year 2025 has been the most thrilling period for Pakistan. In May, Pakistan had to fight Indian aggression in "Operation Sindoor" and re-establish deterrence with its own "Operation Banyan Un Marsoos." Pressure from the US President allowed India to save face, but since then, its leadership has threatened that "Operation Sindoor" is not over and that Pakistan should prepare for "Operation Sindoor:02."
Adding to this Indian threat, it's now evident that India is in an alliance with the Taliban regime. The day the Afghan Foreign Minister began an official visit to India, Afghan forces attacked Pakistan at multiple points along the Durand Line. Interestingly, the Islamophobic Hindutva government of Narendra Modi gave a red-carpet welcome to Amir Khan Muttaqi, who was taken to the Madrassa Deoband and received as a celebrity. Surprisingly, the Afghan FM called the persecution of Muslims in Kashmir and in India an "internal matter" of India, forgetting that he represents the Islamic Emirate, whose every talk begins with Islamic references.
In short, Pakistan is now enveloped by two hostile states: the hostile Hindutva regime of Narendra Modi to the east, and the hostile Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to the west. Afghan moves are visibly coordinated with India. Indian social media is fully supporting the IEA, and IEA supporters are advocating for Modi's India. It is apparent that India wants a two-front war, with the IEA on one side and India on the other, sandwiching Pakistan. The IEA, which has no experience in state-level conflict, is showing consistency in its efforts against Pakistan, while Indian leadership watches for the appropriate moment to resume Sindoor 2.
The IEA's strategy seems to be to engage Pakistan in a prolonged conflict. This helps them rally support from a population that largely dislikes them, while also forcing Pakistan to commit troops to its northwestern border, thereby dividing its forces and aiding India. It is a well-calculated strategy.
On the other side, Pakistan's current strategy appears to be one of attrition, hitting IEA infrastructure and killing as many of their anti-Pakistan proxies as possible.
Coming back to Sun Tzu and Naseem Hijazi, Pakistan must not play the IEA and India's game according to their wishes. Pakistan is a nuclear power, and its deterrence should prevail through the “strategos” it possesses.
The IEA is disliked by the majority in Afghanistan. Pakistan should support groups like the NRF for a potential regime change and use force as little as possible, to avoid giving the IEA a cause to exploit anti-Pakistan sentiments for gathering support. On the other hand, colonial legacies and ground realities can help Pakistan. The IEA's refusal to accept the Durand Line and its aim to use Pashtun sentiments has the potential to alter the ethnic balance in Afghanistan, which is a direct threat to Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.
All of Afghanistan's neighbors who supported the IEA after the Western withdrawal are now unhappy with its policy of destabilizing the region. A strategy must be devised in coordination with these major players to bring a stable government to Afghanistan, one that is a true representative of all ethnicities. Such an agreed-upon government would enable peace and interconnectivity, bringing mutual benefits for all. There fore Pakistan’s goal should be to win the war in the most efficient way possible. Taking advice from great Sun Tzu , the highest form of warfare is to attack strategy itself." If you can understand and disrupt the enemy's grand plan (e.g., by exposing the India-IEA nexus), you render their military moves pointless.
Pakistan's policy must not represent Ares; it should represent Athenian wisdom—an indirect approach. In the words of Sun Tzu, "The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting." Ground conditions create opportunities, and Pakistan needs to adopt this indirect approach instead of attrition.
Writer is Former Journalist, currently a PhD Scholar