#IEA #Taliba #TTP #DurandLine
by Muhammad Bilal Iftikhar Khan
It's been three years since the U.S. and ISAF forces withdrew from Afghanistan. Pakistan, which has historically supported its western neighbor, finds itself once again at odds with Afghanistan—a country that has consistently opposed Pakistan since its inception.
There was a widespread belief in Pakistan that the withdrawal of U.S. and ISAF forces would lead to a reduction in terrorism, with the expectation that the Taliban, unlike the Ghani regime, would cooperate with Pakistan in controlling the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan). The Afghan governments under Hamid Karzai and then Ashraf Ghani were dominated by anti-Pashtun and anti-Pakistan elements, many of whom were associated with the former Northern Alliance, a non-Pashtun, anti-Taliban coalition.
Pakistan, home to the world’s largest Pashtun population, naturally favored Pashtuns over non-Pashtuns, which in turn created animosity with non-Pashtun Afghans. After the U.S. withdrawal, Pakistan supported the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) in the hope that they would curb cross-border terrorism. Meanwhile, India and other anti-Pakistan forces lent support to non-Pashtun, anti-IEA factions.
Many analysts, myself included, believed that Pakistan should back the IEA and refrain from putting too much pressure on them to control the TTP. We feared that pushing the IEA too hard might drive TTP factions into the arms of ISKP (Islamic State Khorasan Province), leading to further destabilization in Afghanistan and the broader region.
However, we were mistaken. In hindsight, it’s clear that defeating superpowers through insurgency on home soil is one thing, but governing a nation is another challenge entirely. The IEA is riddled with internal factions, some of which, according to reports, are anti-Pakistan. Like their predecessors, they do not recognize the Durand Line as an international border. Their perceived victory over the U.S. has given them a dangerous overconfidence, yet they are aware that they cannot govern Afghanistan through sheer force alone in the 21st century.
The IEA is confused and fearful. The situation in Panjshir, growing internal resentment, and the departure of non-Pashtun Taliban members from the IEA are exacerbating their insecurities. They know that anti-Pakistan sentiments resonate with certain groups, which is why they are openly supporting the TTP, with their leaders making inflammatory statements against Pakistan. The IEA seeks allies and is attempting to win them over by appealing to anti-Pakistan sentiments.
On Pakistan’s side, the country has been battling the scourge of terrorism since 2000, at great cost in both blood and treasure. Pakistan cannot afford to foster anti-Pashtun sentiments, yet the IEA and its allies are doing exactly that. This creates a dilemma on both sides—an intricate web of challenges where every decision carries the weight of hidden dilemmas within dilemmas.